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Miller: Legal and Political Fault Lines 
Paul Daly* 
The argument I will advance in this extended note on the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s 
decision in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union is that the decision 
and its aftermath can be usefully understood by reference to three fault lines: between form 
and substance (Part I); between the old constitution and the new constitution (Part II); and 
between political accountability and legal accountability (Part III). The decision and the 
academic debate the litigation provoked revealed that British lawyers are deeply divided 
about how to resolve important questions about the relationship between Parliament, the 
executive and the courts. And the legislative response to Miller reveals that the fault lines can 
operate differently in a political context than they do in a legal context (Part IV). 
As is well known, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union sets out the procedure by 
which a member state can leave the European Union; in particular, Article 50 provides for a 
two-year time period within which a departure can be negotiated and at the end of which the 
member state will leave the EU. Article 50 must first be ‘triggered’, by sending a notification 
to the departing member state’s EU counterparts, in a manner consistent with the departing 
member state’s “domestic constitutional requirements”.  
In June 2016, the UK held a nationwide referendum on EU membership. A majority voted to 
LEAVE, rather than to REMAIN. Once it became clear that the UK government’s position 
was that Article 50 could be triggered by use of the prerogative power in relation to foreign 
affairs, various claimants commenced judicial review proceedings in the Northern Irish and 
English courts, arguing that statutory authority was necessary to provide a legal basis for 
triggering Article 50. 
Decisions were handed down in October 2016. In Re McCord,1 Maguire J. in the Northern 
Ireland High Court rejected all of the claimants’ arguments – which included arguments 
based on Northern Ireland’s devolution arrangements – and concluded that the UK 
government could trigger Article 50 under the prerogative. However, in R (Miller) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,2 the Divisional Court (Lord Thomas of 
Cwmgiedd CJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR and Sales LJ) came to the opposite conclusion on 
the question of whether Article 50 could be triggered as a matter of prerogative.  
Acting fast, the Supreme Court heard appeals from both decisions in December 2016. Given 
that questions about the impact of triggering Article 50 on devolution arrangements had been 
raised, the Scottish and Welsh governments were allowed to make submissions as 
interveners.  
In January 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in R (Miller) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union.3 By majority, in an opinion signed by eight judges 
(Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord 
Sumption and Lord Hodge),4 the Supreme Court held that parliamentary authorisation was 
required for the triggering of Article 50. Three judges (Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath and Lord 
                                                          
1 [2016] NIQB 85 [Re McCord]. 
2 [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) [Miller (DC)]. 
3 [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 [Miller (SC)]. 
4 I will refer to the authors of the majority opinion as “the Miller majority”. 
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Hughes) dissented. However, the Court was unanimous in holding that there was no legal 
requirement, in putting the power to trigger Article 50 on a statutory footing, to gain the 
consent of the devolved governments or legislatures.  
Drawing the fault lines I have described and using them as analytical tools achieves three 
objectives.  
First, providing a description of how and why judges and academic commentators disagreed 
about the disposition of the case. Second, illustrating that important tensions are to be found 
in the reasoning of the Miller majority. For instance, on the juridical effect of triggering 
Article 50, substance trumped form, but when it came to the impact of triggering Article 50 
on the devolution arrangements, form trumped substance; the ‘constitutional’ nature of the 
1972 Act weighed heavily in the balance, but other constitutional innovations, such as 
referendums and devolution, exerted next to no weight at all; and although the executive’s 
political accountability as a matter of constitutional convention was deemed to be insufficient 
justification for avoiding parliamentary authorisation for the triggering of Article 50, the 
enforcement of constitutional conventions relating to devolution was left entirely to political 
actors. The fault lines thus expose important tensions in the reasoning of the Miller majority. 
Third, demonstrating that these fault lines are political as well as legal. The relationship 
between form and substance, old and new and political and legal shaped Parliament’s 
response to Miller just as much as it shaped the judgments of the Supreme Court and the first-
instance courts. In the political arena, interestingly, form triumphed over substance, the 
referendum result carried decisive weight, and confidence about the effectiveness of 
conventional methods of parliamentary oversight of the executive outweighed concerns about 
the need for legal protection of the interests of individuals or Parliament. This does not 
represent an additional criticism of the judges. I mean only to highlight how the legislative 
response to Miller demonstrates that, under Britain’s constitutional arrangements, legal and 
political actors do not respond in the same way to the same stimuli. This phenomenon may 
not be unique to Britain, but if so, Miller is a striking example that ought to be of interest to 
constitutional lawyers in other jurisdictions. 
In what follows, I will refer not only to the decisions handed down by the three courts but 
also to literature produced by academic commentators on blogs, principally the UK 
Constitutional Law Blog. A remarkable feature of the Miller litigation was the extent to 
which academics waded in, publicly, on the legal questions the judges had to address. The 
Supreme Court praised the role academic commentators had played, paying “tribute” to how 
their “illuminating articles” resulted in the arguments presented to the Supreme Court being 
more “refined” than those presented at first instance.5 
 
 
                                                          
5 Miller (SC), at para. 11. See also ibid., at para. 274, per Lord Carnwath: “The very full debate in the courts has 
been supplemented by a vigorous and illuminating academic debate conducted on the web (particularly through 
the UK Constitutional Law Blog site)”. The blog entries referred to are accessible at the following address: 
(available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)). See further Paul Daly, “Legal Academia 2.0: New and Old 




I. Form and Substance 
The first fault line is form and substance.6 A substantive reason “may be defined as a moral, 
economic, political, institutional, or other social consideration” whereas a formal reason “is a 
legally authoritative reason on which judges and others are empowered or required to base a 
decision or action, and such a reason usually excludes from consideration, overrides, or at 
least reduces the weight of, any countervailing substantive reasoning arising at the point of 
decision or action”.7 Accordingly, by form, I mean analysis of legal acts and categories 
distinct from the effects of doing the acts or placing items in different categories. By 
substance, I mean analysis of the wider consequences of performing acts or placing items in 
categories.8  
Drawing the form and substance fault line helps to illustrate why the consequences of 
triggering Article 50 were disputed. One group of judges and academic commentators argued 
that the Article 50 notification per se had no juristic effect; another group argued the 
opposite. The groups disagreed fundamentally on the nature of the relationship between EU 
law and domestic constitutional law, some taking the view that the introduction of EU law 
into the British constitutional order effected no substantive change, others taking a 
diametrically opposed view. This dispute also had an impact on the assessment of the 
consequences for the devolution arrangements of triggering Article 50.  
A. The Relationship Between EU Law and UK Law 
A consideration of the terms of the European Communities Act 1972 is the best place to start. 
Section 2(1) provides: 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from 
time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties 
are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom 
shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed 
accordingly… 
The result is that directly effective European Union measures (Commission decisions, 
regulations, and directives and Treaty provisions couched in sufficiently clear terms) have 
                                                          
6 See also Alison Young, “R (Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 
2768 (Admin): Constitutional Adjudication – Reality over Legality?”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, November 
9, 2016 (available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/09/alison-young-r-miller-v-the-secretary-of-state-
for-exiting-the-european-union-2016-ewhc-2768-admin-constitutional-adjudication-reality-over-legality/). 
7 P.S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1987), at pp. 2-5. 
8 I would not say, however, that members of one group are “formalists” and that members of the other group are 
“substantivists” – I do not mean, in other words, to suggest that the positions judges and commentators took in 
this context are linked to deeper theoretical or philosophical commitments that the judges and commentators 
have about public law in general. Nor do I mean to use “formalism” in a pejorative sense: there may be perfectly 
defensible reasons for one to take a “formal” view of, for instance, the relationship between European Union 
law and domestic law (for an introduction to the competing views, see Paul Craig, “Sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom Parliament after Factortame” (1991) 11 Yearbook of European Law 221; T.R.S. Allan, “Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: Law, Politics and Revolution” (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 443). My distinction between 
“form” and “substance” is designed to serve a heuristic purpose, nothing more. 
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effect in British law automatically without further Parliamentary action. Section 2(2) makes 
provision for delegated legislation designed to give effect to EU law obligations. Section 
2(4), though not a model of clarity, provides that EU law obligations will prevail over 
domestic law norms in the event of conflict. 
One view, which focuses on form, is that the 1972 Act is simply the “conduit” through which 
EU law flows “from time to time”.9 Indeed, the 1972 Act is expressly premised on exercises 
of the prerogative that would cause Britain to become a party to “the Treaties”. Without the 
prerogative, s. 2(1) would simply make no sense. Such “rights” as exist under this regime are 
“rights from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties”.10 As Professor Finnis 
put it: 
Treaty-based rights are statutory in that they depend for their effect in UK law on 
Parliamentary enactment; but they are not statutory inasmuch as they are not 
themselves enacted by Parliament and can be terminated (“destroyed”) by termination 
of treaties in the course of the Crown’s dealings with foreign entities or states.11 
For Lord Reed, the rights enjoyed by individuals by virtue of the UK’s membership of the 
EU are “inherently conditional on the application of the EU treaties to the UK…”12 On this 
view, triggering Article 50 changes nothing, a conclusion that for Lord Reed flowed 
inexorably from the form of the 1972 Act, which “creates a scheme under which the effect 
given to EU law in domestic law exactly matches the UK’s international obligations, 
whatever they may be”;13 any rights therein are “inherently contingent” on agreements struck 
between the EU member states on the international plane.14 Triggering Article 50 simply 
“commence[s] the formal legal process by which the UK leaves the EU, no more and no 
less”.15 As Maguire J. put it in Re McCord: 
On the day after the notice has been given, the law will in fact be the same as it was 
the day before it was given.  The rights of individual citizens will not have changed – 
though it is, of course, true that in due course the body of EU law as it applies in the 
United Kingdom will, very likely, become the subject of change.  But at the point 
                                                          
9 Miller (SC), at para. 65, associating this view with Professor John Finnis. See also Mark Elliott & Hayley J. 
Hooper, “Critical reflections on the High Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union”, U.K. Const. L. Blog, November 7, 2016 (available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/07/mark-elliot-and-hayley-hooper-critical-reflections-on-the-high-
courts-judgment-in-r-miller-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-union/). 
10 John Finnis, “Terminating Treaty-based UK Rights”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 26 October 2016 
(available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/26/john-finnis-terminating-treaty-based-uk-rights/). 
11 John Finnis, “Terminating Treaty-based UK Rights”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 26 October 2016 
(available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/26/john-finnis-terminating-treaty-based-uk-rights/). 
12 Miller (SC), at para. 177, per Lord Reed. 
13 Miller (SC), at para. 189. 
14 Miller (SC), at para. 216, per Lord Reed. 
15 Adam Tomkins, “Brexit, Democracy and the Rule of Law”, Notes from North Britain, November 5, 2016 
(available at: https://notesfromnorthbritain.wordpress.com/2016/11/05/brexit-democracy-and-the-rule-of-law/). 
See also Miller (SC), at para. 218, per Lord Reed: “The giving of notification does not in itself alter EU rights or 
the effect given to them in domestic law”. 
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when this occurs the process necessarily will be one controlled by parliamentary 
legislation, as this is the mechanism for changing the law in the United Kingdom.16 
Moreover, even at the end of the Article 50 period, the 1972 Act would remain on the books, 
ready to spring back to life if Britain were to re-enter the “Treaties”. As Lord Reed put it, 
“Parliament has created a scheme under which domestic law tracks the obligations of the UK 
at the international level, whatever they may be”.17 But in the meantime, the Act will “cease 
to operate because there are no longer any treaty rules for it to bite upon”.18 Indeed, on this 
more formal view, no fundamental change in the domestic constitutional system would be 
effected just by triggering Article 50: “the rule of recognition is unchanged”.19 
The opposing view, which focuses on substance, is that triggering Article 50 will turn the 
1972 Act “into what is in substance a dead letter”,20 because the inevitable effect will be that, 
two years later, a series of rights in three categories — directly effective rights (such as 
worker protections) enjoyed in the UK, directly effective rights (such as freedom of 
movement) enjoyed by UK citizens elsewhere in Europe and derivative rights (such as the 
ability to stand for election to the European Parliament) – will be eliminated: “By issuing an 
Article 50 declaration, the Prime Minister would start the process that would inevitably end 
in the loss of EU rights (even if a way was found to negotiate a set of substitute, non-Treaty 
rights)”.21 As the Divisional Court observed, triggering Article 50 would, in respect of the 
three categories of rights, “deprive[] domestic law rights created by the ECA 1972 of 
effect”;22 effect a “material change” to domestic law;23 and “undo…rights which Parliament 
intended to bring into effect”.24 
The Miller majority took a similar view of the 1972 Act. They refused to accept that 
triggering Article 50 would be a mere formality. Doing so would, rather, “cut off the source 
of EU law entirely”,25 eliminating EU law and rights derived from it from the domestic legal 
                                                          
16 Re McCord, at para. 105. The particular result there was that triggering Article 50 would have no effect on the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998, two sections of which (ss. 6(2)(d) and 24(1)(b)) prohibit legislative and 
administrative action that would be incompatible with EU law. 
17 Miller (SC), at para. 204. 
18 Miller (SC), at para. 281, per Lord Hughes. 
19 Miller (SC), at para. 226. Compare H.R.W. Wade, “Sovereignty – Evolution or Revolution?” (1996) 112 Law 
Quarterly Review 568. 
20 Nick Barber, Tom Hickman and Jeff King, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable 
Role”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 27 June 2016 (available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-
trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/). As the Miller majority put it, “by the 1972 Act, Parliament endorsed 
and gave effect to the United Kingdom’s membership of what is now the European Union under the EU Treaties 
in a way which is inconsistent with the future exercise by ministers of any prerogative power to withdraw from 
such Treaties”. Miller (SC), at para. 77. See similarly at paras. 81, 83, 95. The Miller majority and Lord Reed 
disagreed about the inferences one could draw from the 1972 Act on the extent to which a distinction could be 
made between modifications to the Treaties (with consequent effects on rights) and withdrawal from the 
Treaties (with consequent elimination of rights). As Lord Carnwath observed, however, it is “illogical to search 
in that Act for a presumed Parliamentary intention in respect of withdrawal, at a time when the treaty contained 
no express power to withdraw, and there was no reason for Parliament to consider it”. Miller (SC), at para. 257.  
21 Nick Barber, Tom Hickman and Jeff King, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable 
Role”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 27 June 2016 (available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-
trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/). 
22 Miller (DC), at para. 64. 
23 Miller (DC), at para. 64. 
24 Miller (DC), at para. 66. 
25 Miller (SC), at para. 79. 
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system. Triggering Article 50 would, inevitably, have far-reaching substantive consequences: 
“Even those legal rules derived from EU law and transposed into UK law by domestic 
legislation will have a different status. They will no longer be paramount, but will be open to 
domestic repeal or amendment in ways that may be inconsistent with EU law”.26 In 
particular, the category one rights would be lost unless Parliament chose to replicate them in 
domestic law;27 that Parliament might ultimately decide to do so28 could not establish the 
lawfulness of triggering Article 50 as an act of prerogative, because “the die will be cast 
before Parliament has become formally involved”.29 
B. Devolution 
The form and substance fault line cut across another set of issues decided in Miller, relating 
to the effect of Brexit on the devolved administrations. Although devolution operates quite 
differently in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, some common issues arise. Do they have 
to consent (by means of legislative consent motions30) to any legislation passed by 
Westminster to authorise the triggering of Article 50? In Re McCord, mindful that the 
Westminster Parliament retains plenary power “to make laws for Northern Ireland”,31 
Maguire J. replied in the negative, on the basis that relations with the EU remain the sole and 
exclusive competence of the Westminster Parliament:32 “the better view is that any legislation 
for the purpose of notification under Article 50(2) would be legislation relating to an 
excepted matter i.e it would be legislation concerning relations with the European 
Communities and their institutions. It would not, in the court’s view, be legislation ‘with 
regards to devolved matters’, even if one was to adopt a broad approach to the meaning of 
this phrase”, as a matter of constitutional convention.33 
But this might be to elevate form over substance. For Maguire J. also said: “The devolved 
institutions, to a greater or lesser extent, within the area transferred to them will be 
administering EU provisions and considering the future development of EU law in relevant 
subject areas”.34 It is unclear the extent to which areas such as agriculture, currently 
dominated by EU law, will be regulated post-Brexit by the devolved institutions; the default 
position under the Northern Irish and Scottish devolution legislation is that agricultural 
matters would be devolved.35 Maguire J. can at least be read as suggesting that it will fall to 
                                                          
26 Miller (SC), at para. 80. 
27 Miller (SC), at paras. 70, 73. Lord Reed acknowledged that some rights would be inevitably lost, no matter 
what Parliament subsequently decrees: “Parliament…cannot establish those elements of [EU law] which involve 
reciprocal arrangements with the other member states, or which involve the participation of EU institutions. Nor 
can it create rights which have the distinguishing characteristics of EU rights, such as priority over subsequent 
legislation, and authoritative interpretation by the Court of Justice”. Miller (SC), at para. 218. Even though Lord 
Reed recognised that triggering Article 50 can have substantive effects, he fell back on his view of the form of 
the 1972 Act: “the rights are not revoked by the Crown’s exercise of prerogative powers: they are revoked by 
the operation of the Act of Parliament itself”. Miller (SC), at para. 219. 
28 See especially Miller (SC), at para. 218, per Lord Reed: “Parliament can enact whatever provisions it sees fit 
in order to address the consequences of withdrawal from the EU, including provisions designed to protect rights 
which are currently derived from EU law”. 
29 Miller (SC), at para. 94. 
30 See e.g. Scottish Government, “Sewel Convention - Legislative Consent Motions”, March 18, 2016 (available 
at: http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/Sewel). 
31 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 5(6). 
32 Northern Ireland Act, 1998, Schedule 2. 
33 Re McCord, at para. 121. 
34 Re McCord, at para. 106, emphasis added. 
35 The Prime Minister has said that these matters would be for negotiation: 
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the Northern Irish institutions to “administer[] EU provisions”, which raises the prospect that 
triggering Article 50 might indeed have an effect “with regards to devolved matters”, 
especially given that the nature of the regulatory regimes (now subject to EU law) would 
inevitably change post-Brexit. More generally, the devolved administrations are obliged to 
comply with EU law, an obligation that will be either strange or ineffective once the UK has 
left the EU. In a curious passage, the Miller majority seemed to accept that triggering Article 
50 would effect a substantive change to the devolution arrangements: 
…it is normally impermissible for statutory rights to be removed by the exercise of 
prerogative powers in the international sphere. It would accordingly be incongruous if 
constraints imposed on the legislative competence of the devolved administrations by 
specific statutory provisions were to be removed, thereby enlarging that competence, 
other than by statute. A related incongruity arises by virtue of the fact that observance 
and implementation of EU obligations are a transferred matter and therefore the 
responsibility of the devolved administration in Northern Ireland. The removal of a 
responsibility imposed by Parliament by ministerial use of prerogative powers might 
also be considered a constitutional anomaly. In light of our conclusion that a statute is 
required to authorise the decision to withdraw from the European Union, and 
therefore the giving of Notice, it is not necessary to reach a definitive view on the first 
referred question. The EU constraints and the provisions empowering the 
implementation of EU law are certainly consistent with our interpretation of the 1972 
Act but we refrain from deciding whether they impose a discrete requirement for 
Parliamentary legislation.36 
Having already concluded that legislation was necessary to provide the authority to trigger 
Article 50, the Miller majority was able to avoid coming to a definitive conclusion on 
whether legislation would be needed to account for changes to devolution arrangements as 
well as for the elimination of EU law and EU-law derived rights. Plainly, however, the 
quoted passage – especially the highlighted portions – strongly suggests that a substantive 
change would be effected. 
This makes the Miller majority’s conclusions on the devolution issues all the more puzzling. 
On this point, the Miller majority spoke for the whole court. Although s. 28(7) of the 
Scotland Act 1998 makes clear that devolution “does not affect the power of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland”, the relevant constitutional convention 
(the Sewel Convention) has now been placed on a statutory footing by the Scotland Act 
2016:37 “it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.  
In the Court’s view, however, judges “are neither the parents nor the guardians of political 
conventions; they are merely observers”.38 The Sewel Convention “operates as a political 
                                                          
Part of [delivering a Brexit that works for Britain] will mean working very carefully to ensure that – as 
powers are repatriated from Brussels back to Britain – the right powers are returned to Westminster, 
and the right powers are passed to the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
Theresa May, “The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech”, January 17, 2017 
(available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-
eu-pm-speech). 
36 Miller (SC), at para. 132, emphasis added. 
37 See s. 2, inserting a new s. 28(8) in the Scotland Act 1998. 
38 Miller (SC), at para. 146. 
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restriction on the activity of the UK Parliament”, activity on which, pursuant to Article 9 of 
the Bill of Rights, the courts are not permitted to adjudicate.39 By enacting the Scotland Act 
2016 “the UK Parliament [was] not seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule 
which can be interpreted, let alone enforced, by the courts; rather, it [was] recognising the 
convention for what it is, namely a political convention, and [was] effectively declaring that it 
is a permanent feature of the relevant devolution arrangement”.40 That the Sewel Convention 
is on a statutory footing changes nothing – it is a statute that ‘bears no law’,41 or, one might 
say, a matter of form rather than substance. Even though the Miller majority recognised the 
substantive effect that triggering Article 50 would have on the devolution arrangements and 
took a substantive rather than formal view of the effect that triggering Article 50 would have 
on UK law, it refused to give any substance to the Sewel Convention. 
II. The Old Constitution and the New Constitution 
The second fault line is the old and the new. The “Old Constitution” can be described as 
follows. Since the Glorious Revolution, the British Constitution has featured the Queen-in-
Parliament at its heart. There are no higher norms in the British constitutional order than 
those laws duly passed by the House of Commons and the House of Lords.42 What 
Parliament enacts is the supreme law of the land and Parliament can make or unmake any law 
on any subject.43 The prerogative continues to subsist as the “residue of discretionary or 
arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown”,44 as 
long as it has not been superseded by statute – it is, as Lord Reid once said, “a relic of a past 
age, not lost by disuse, but only available for a case not covered by statute”.45 
But this old view is, as Lord Reid’s dictum implies, being displaced by the new. On the one 
hand, there is significant momentum behind those who argue that sovereignty is “bi-polar”, 
shared between Parliament (acting in the political sphere by developing policy) and the courts 
(acting in the legal sphere by developing the common law),46 and those who might be 
tempted to see sovereignty, in today’s globalised world of international agreements and 
regulatory standards, as chimerical;47 moreover, with its patchwork of devolution statutes, 
Britain resembles less and less a unitary state.48 On the other hand, direct democracy has 
begun to creep onto territory previously occupied by Parliament. Referendums, whether on 
devolution of powers, reform of the electoral system or membership of international 
organizations, have become predicates to the passing of legislation on certain fundamental 
                                                          
39 Miller (SC), at para. 145. 
40 Miller (SC), at para. 148. 
41 David Feldman, “Legislation Which Bears No Law” (2016) 37 (3) Statute Law Review 212. 
42 See e.g. Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] A.C. 765, at p. 798, per Lord Simon; British Coal 
Corporation v The King [1935] A.C. 500, at pp. 520-522, per Lord Sankey (P.C.). 
43 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1959) at 
p. 40. 
44 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1959) at 
p. 424. 
45 Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] A.C. 75, at p. 101. 
46 The term is associated with Sir Stephen Sedley. See e.g. “Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda” 
[1995] PL 386. 
47 See generally, Cheryl Saunders, “Designing and operating constitutions in global context” in David Feldman 
and Mark Elliott eds., The Cambridge Companion to Public Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2016), at p. 256. 
48 Mark Elliott, “Law, Rights and Constitutional Politics” in Guy Lodge and Glenn Gottfried ed., Democracy in 
Britain: Essays in honour of James Cornford (IPPR, London, 2014), at p. 91.  
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matters.49 Finally — and here the two hands meet — the common law has begun to recognize 
a new category of ‘constitutional’ statutes, which are immune from implied repeal50 and, 
beyond that, may be taken to express certain constitutional fundamentals about the British 
legal order;51 judges have even suggested that, in “exceptional circumstances” the courts 
could legitimately refuse to apply legislation passed by Parliament.52 The upshot is that there 
is, arguably, a “hierarchy of domestic constitutional norms”, a phenomenon that can more 
readily emerge in a climate in which sovereignty is fragmented and/or variegated.53 
The clash between the old and new constitutions prompted two questions in respect of Article 
50, relating to the referendum and the nature of ‘constitutional’ statutes.  
A. ‘Constitutional’ Statutes 
In Miller, the Divisional Court placed significant emphasis on the ‘constitutional’ nature of 
the 1972 Act. For these first-instance judges, the government’s argument that the claimants 
had to identify an abrogation of the prerogative in the 1972 Act “left out part of the relevant 
constitutional background”.54 Rather, statutory interpretation — especially of a 
‘constitutional’ statute — “must proceed having regard to background constitutional 
principles which inform the inferences to be drawn as to what Parliament intended by 
legislating the way it did”; the statute has to be read “in the light of constitutional 
principle”.55 
Critics objected to the Divisional Court’s imputation of an intention to Parliament. For 
instance, “the common law’s designation of a statute as ‘constitutional’ does not tell us 
anything whatever about legislative intention, because that designation is in the first place a 
matter of common law”.56 Put another way, “a statutory provision is constitutional not 
because the legislature intended it to have that status (which in any case had not been 
recognized in law when the 1972 Act was passing through Parliament) but because the 
                                                          
49 Brigid Hadfield, “Devolution: A National Conversation” in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver eds., The 
Changing Constitution, 7th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), p. 213, at p. 233 suggests that 
devolution has radically altered the constitutional order:  
[D]evolution marks a clear movement from the formal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty standing 
alone…to its combination with a process, already a constitutional convention, whereby the holding of a 
referendum on any fundamental change to devolution…is not a matter of a concession or a (central 
government) convenience (for resolving internal disputes) but a nascent right. Devolution is not simply 
a gift from the Westminster Parliament but a reflection of an autochthonous movement which 
continues to develop. 
50 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] Q.B. 151. 
51 See e.g. R. (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324, 
especially at para. 207, per Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance. 
52 Jackson v Attorney General [2006] 1 A.C. 262, at para. 102, per Lord Steyn; see also, ibid., at para. 104, per 
Lord Hope and at para. 159, per Baroness Hale, Axa General Insurance v Lord Advocate, [2011] UKSC 46, 
[2012] 1 A.C. 868, at para. 51, per Lord Hope, at para. 97, per Lord Mance and at para. 153, per Lord Reed. 
53 Mark Elliott, “Reflections on the HS2 case: a hierarchy of domestic constitutional norms and the qualified 
primacy of EU law”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 23 January, 2014 (available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/01/23/mark-elliott-reflections-on-the-hs2-case-a-hierarchy-of-domestic-
constitutional-norms-and-the-qualified-primacy-of-eu-law/). 
54 Miller (DC), at para. 84. 
55 Miller (DC), at para. 82. 
56 Mark Elliott & Hayley J. Hooper, “Critical reflections on the High Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v Secretary 





common law confers that status on it”.57 The critics are surely right on this point: the notion 
of a statute being ‘constitutional’ in nature only emerged many years after the enactment of 
the 1972 Act;58 Parliament could not be said to have “intended” effects that it has 
subsequently been interpreted as having.  
But “EU law is sui generis as a matter of constitutional law…because domestic law has 
provided for its direct effect”59 — indeed, overriding direct effect; the normative force of EU 
law is of a different order to anything else the common law has recognised. No other statute 
has been held to be immune from implied repeal60 or require the inoperability of other laws 
passed by Parliament.61 The 1972 Act, as passed by Parliament and interpreted by the courts 
is a “constitutional innovation”.62  
The “effect” of the 1972 Act, as the Miller majority observed, was “to constitute EU law an 
independent and overriding source of domestic law”.63 This was an innovation, which gave 
the 1972 Act a “constitutional character”:64 “The primacy of EU law means that, unlike other 
rules of domestic law, EU law cannot be implicitly displaced by the mere enactment of 
legislation which is inconsistent with it”.65 Indeed, the provisions of the 1972 Act were 
“unique in their legislative and constitutional implications”.66 The 1972 Act did 
“considerably more” than statutes that give effect to international treaties in domestic law; it 
was “unprecedented” in “constitutional terms” because “[i]t authorises a dynamic process by 
which, without further primary legislation (and, in some cases, even without any domestic 
legislation), EU law not only becomes a source of UK law, but actually takes precedence 
over all domestic sources of UK law, including statutes”.67 By removing EU law from the 
British legal order, the triggering of Article 50 would effect a “major constitutional 
change”:68 
A complete withdrawal represents a change which is different not just in degree but in 
kind from the abrogation of particular rights, duties or rules derived from EU law. It 
will constitute as significant a constitutional change as that which occurred when EU 
law was first incorporated in domestic law by the 1972 Act. And, if Notice is given, 
this change will occur irrespective of whether Parliament repeals the 1972 Act. It 
would be inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental principle for such a far-
reaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements to be brought about by 
ministerial decision or ministerial action alone. All the more so when the source in 
                                                          
57 David Feldman, “Brexit, the Royal Prerogative, and Parliamentary Sovereignty”, UK Const. L. Blog, 8 
November 2016 (available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/08/david-feldman-brexit-the-royal-
prerogative-and-parliamentary-sovereignty/) 
58 See Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) [2003] Q.B. 151. 
59 Sir Jeffrey Jowell Q.C. and Naina Patel, “Miller Is Right”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 15 November, 2016 
(available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/15/sir-jeffrey-jowell-qc-and-naina-patel-miller-is-right/). 
60 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) [2003] Q.B. 151. 
61 R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 and R v Secretary of State 
for Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 5) [2000] 1 A.C. 524.  
62 Sir Jeffrey Jowell Q.C. and Naina Patel, “Miller Is Right”, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 15 November, 2016 
(available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/15/sir-jeffrey-jowell-qc-and-naina-patel-miller-is-right/). 
63 Miller (SC), at para. 65. 
64 Miller (SC), at para. 67. 
65 Miller (SC), at para. 66. 
66 Miller (SC), at para. 90. 
67 Miller (SC), at para. 60. 
68 Miller (SC), at para.100.  
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question was brought into existence by Parliament through primary legislation, which 
gave that source an overriding supremacy in the hierarchy of domestic law sources.69 
The “clear implication” from the terms of the 1972 Act “is that the continued existence of the 
conduit pipe, as opposed to the contents which flow through it, can be changed only if 
Parliament changes the law”.70 Such a fundamental alteration of the UK’s constitutional 
architecture could only be effected under the authority of an Act of Parliament, not “by 
ministers alone”; “it must be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, 
namely by Parliamentary legislation”.71 The overriding status that EU law enjoys in the 
domestic legal order resulted from Parliament and the executive acting in tandem: “before (i) 
signing and (ii) ratifying the 1972 Accession Treaty, ministers, acting internationally, waited 
for Parliament, acting domestically, (i) to give clear, if not legally binding, approval in the 
form of resolutions, and (ii) to enable the Treaty to be effective by passing the 1972 Act”.72 
With this history and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in mind, “it seems most 
improbable that those two parties had the intention or expectation that ministers, 
constitutionally the junior partner in that exercise, could subsequently remove the graft 
without formal appropriate sanction from the constitutionally senior partner in that exercise, 
Parliament”.73 On the Miller majority’s view, it might be said, ‘constitutional’ statutes – and 
their fundamental features – cannot be modified by the executive acting alone. This view is 
eminently plausible, in isolation. 
B. Direct Democracy 
But the Miller majority’s view of the permissible modalities of major constitutional change is 
open to a serious objection in this particular context. The constitutional change envisaged by 
the executive was to be effected on foot of a referendum result; it did not arise in a vacuum.  
One line of criticism of the Divisional Court’s decision in Miller was based on how little 
weight was given to the referendum, a “stark omission”: “Ministers’ exercise of the 
prerogative to trigger Article 50 is no ordinary executive act: it is an act ministers have been 
told to undertake in a referendum authorised by Act of Parliament”.74 Indeed, it was argued 
that “[t]he [Divisional] Court’s determination to examine the constitutional appropriateness 
of executive action triggering Article 50 without any reference to the broader context lends 
the decision a highly artificial air”.75 It is true that, as Lord Reed observed in Miller, the 
parties proceeded “on the basis that the referendum on membership of the EU…does not 
provide the answer” to the question whether triggering Article 50 required legislation or 
not.76 He noted, nonetheless, that “Parliament considered withdrawal from the EU, and made 
the holding of a referendum part of the process of taking the decision under article 50(1)”.77 
                                                          
69 Miller (SC), at para. 81. 
70 Miller (SC), at para. 84. 
71 Miller (SC), at para. 82. 
72 Miller (SC), at para. 90. 
73 Miller (SC), at para. 90. 
74 Adam Tomkins, “Brexit, Democracy and the Rule of Law”, Notes from North Britain, November 5, 2016 
(https://notesfromnorthbritain.wordpress.com/2016/11/05/brexit-democracy-and-the-rule-of-law/). 
75 Mark Elliott & Hayley J. Hooper, “Critical reflections on the High Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union” U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 7 November, 2016 (available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/07/mark-elliot-and-hayley-hooper-critical-reflections-on-the-high-
courts-judgment-in-r-miller-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-union/). 
76 Miller (SC), at para. 171. 
77 Miller (SC), at para. 214. 
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And for Lord Carnwath the referendum formed part of the background context in which the 
executive proposed to use the prerogative to trigger Article 50: “It is one thing…to use the 
prerogative to introduce a scheme which is directly contrary to an extant Act, and which 
Parliament has had no chance to consider. It is quite another to use it to give effect to a 
decision the manner of which has been determined by Parliament itself, and in the 
implementation of which Parliament will play a central role”.78  
The Miller majority gave short shrift to this line of argument: “Where, as in this case, 
implementation of a referendum result requires a change in the law of the land, and statute 
has not provided for that change, the change in the law must be made in the only way in 
which the UK constitution permits, namely through Parliamentary legislation”.79 The 
procedural posture of the Miller litigation might well be significant. The claimants did not 
attack the reasonableness of political reliance on the referendum result to justify triggering 
Article 50. Rather, they attacked the existence of a prerogative power to trigger Article 50 in 
the first place: their claim went to the jurisdiction to trigger Article 50, not to the merits of 
doing so. The distinction relied upon by the Miller majority between jurisdiction – the 
authority to trigger Article 50 – and merits – the rationality of doing so – is a formal 
distinction. Using the distinction may well be defensible, but such heavy reliance on a formal 
distinction here, having preferred (for the most part) a substantive approach on the effects of 
triggering Article 50, is at least incongruous. Moreover, when one takes into account the 
importance accorded to the ‘constitutional’ nature of the 1972 Act, the distinction relied upon 
to avoid giving weight to the result of the referendum – itself a constitutional innovation – 
beings to look tenuous if not opportunistic. 
It is true that, pushed to its logical conclusion, the government’s position was that it would 
have had jurisdiction to trigger Article 50 with or without a referendum. The Miller majority 
found this proposition “implausible”, because “it would have been open to ministers to take 
such a course on or at any time after 2 January 1973 without authorisation by 
Parliament…even if there had been no referendum or indeed, at least in theory, even if any 
referendum had resulted in a vote to remain”.80 However, the rationality of any such 
purported exercise of the foreign affairs prerogative could be called into question in the 
courts. Although the Miller majority described this as a “bold suggestion”,81 there are recent 
examples of British courts adjudicating on the rationality of exercises of the foreign affairs 
prerogative.82 Were the Prime Minister to have attempted, prior to the referendum result or 
notwithstanding a REMAIN vote, to trigger Article 50 on the basis, to take an outlandish 
example, that the German Chancellor has red hair, judicial review would be possible.83 Of 
course, it is necessary to posit an outlandish example because any such review would be 
highly deferential.84 But there would be a safeguard, in the form of rationality review, to 
prevent the occurrence of the scenario feared by the Miller majority.85 In other words, a firm 
                                                          
78 Miller (SC), at para. 267. 
79 Miller (SC), at para. 121. 
80 Miller (SC), at para. 91. 
81 Miller (SC), at para. 92. 
82 See R. (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61, 
[2009] 1 A.C. 453, at para. 35, per Lord Hoffmann; and e.g. R. (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2014] UKSC 44, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 2697. 
83 Short v Poole Corporation [1926] Ch. 66 at pp. 90-91; Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
84 See generally Paul Daly, “Justiciability and the ‘Political Question’ Doctrine” [2010] PL 160. 
85 By contrast, in Re McCord Maguire J. relied on the referendum result because in the Northern Ireland case the 
reasonableness of the government’s exercise of the prerogative was in issue. Maguire J. rejected the claim that 
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distinction between jurisdiction and merits in respect of triggering Article 50 might not be as 
necessary as the Miller majority seemed to think.  
Furthermore, the Miller majority’s response to the argument that s. 1 of the Northern Ireland 
Act 199886 memorialised the ‘principle of consent’ again privileged the ‘old’ over the ‘new’. 
In their view, the provision “gave the people of Northern Ireland the right to determine 
whether to remain part of the United Kingdom or to become part of a united Ireland” but 
“neither regulated any other change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland nor 
required the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland to the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union”.87 Standing on its own, there might much to be 
said for the Miller majority’s proposition. But by refusing to countenance a creative approach 
to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (and, for that matter, the Scotland Act 2016), while 
emphasising the extraordinary nature of the 1972 Act, the Miller majority again left itself 
open to the charge of opportunism.  
III. Legal and Political Accountability 
The third fault line lies between legal accountability and political accountability. It might be 
said that there are (at least)88 two perspectives on the British constitution. One is primarily 
characterised by legal accountability and emphasises the role of courts in imposing 
constraints of law and due process on the freedom of action of those in the political branches 
of government.89 For instance, it is “fundamental to the rule of law that decisions and actions 
of the executive are, subject to necessary well established exceptions (such as declarations of 
war), and jealously scrutinised statutory exceptions, reviewable by the court at the suit of an 
interested citizen”.90 Similarly, constitutional principles will constrain grants of authority, 
such that, to take a well-known example, powers to modify statutory provisions by 
                                                          
triggering Article 50 would be substantively unreasonable. A number of arguments were made, relating to 
matters such as Northern Ireland’s unique constitutional place in the United Kingdom, the need to assess 
alternative options and the giving of excessive weight to the referendum result. See Re McCord, at para. 125. 
For Maguire J., it was “difficult to avoid the conclusion that a decision concerning notification under Article 
50(2) made at the most senior level in United Kingdom politics, giving notice of withdrawal from the EU by the 
United Kingdom following a national referendum, is other than one of high policy…unsuitable for judicial 
review”. Re McCord, at para. 133, emphasis added. I would not take this to mean that such questions are 
inherently unreviewable — Maguire J. cited Youssef v Foreign Secretary [2016] 2 W.L.R. 509, Sandiford and 
Bancoult (No. 2), each of which countenances review of even sensitive prerogatives in respect of foreign affairs 
— but that the applicants did not discharge the heavy burden of demonstrating that the government’s desire to 
proceed with triggering Article 50 would be unreasonable. Inviting a court to second-guess the weight the 
executive should give to factors relevant to the exercise of a discretionary power is rarely successful. Maguire 
J.’s conclusion is correct, though the language of “high policy”, is too strong inasmuch as it suggests that the 
substance of the Article 50 notification is inherently unreviewable. 
86 The section provides: 
(1)It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and 
shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a 
poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1. 
(2)But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part 
of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before 
Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland. 
87 Miller (SC), at para. 135. 
88 See also David Feldman, “None, One, or Several? Perspectives on the UK’s Constitution(s)” (2005) 64 CLJ 
329. 
89 See e.g. Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), at p. 
35-37, using the terms political and legal constitutionalism. 
90 R. (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] 1 A.C. 1787, at para. 52, per Lord Neuberger. 
14 
 
subordinate legislation (so-called Henry VIII Clauses) will be narrowly construed.91 And, of 
course, where fundamental rights are at stake, Parliament must clearly authorise their 
elimination: this is the “principle of legality” and it “means that Parliament must squarely 
confront what it is doing and accept the political cost”.92 
But a competing perspective is characterised by political accountability, which relies on 
individual interests and the public good being safeguarded by robust debate within the 
political process.93 On this view, constitutional principles, including fundamental rights, are 
protected by the proper operation of political institutions and public debate: “Parliament has 
its own special means of ensuring that the executive, in the exercise of delegated functions, 
performs in a way which Parliament finds appropriate. Ideally, it is these latter methods 
which should be used to check executive errors and excesses; for it is the task of Parliament 
and the executive in tandem, not of the courts, to govern the country”.94  
A. Emphasising Political Accountability: the Miller Dissenters 
The dissenters in Miller were heavily influenced by the importance (in their view) of political 
accountability. In Lord Carnwath’s view, “[t]he Executive is accountable to Parliament for its 
exercise of the prerogative, including its actions in international law. That account is made 
through ordinary Parliamentary procedures”.95 Lord Reed was even more forthright: 
…controls over the exercise of ministerial powers under the British constitution are 
not solely, or even primarily, of a legal character...Courts should not overlook the 
constitutional importance of ministerial accountability to Parliament. Ministerial 
decisions in the exercise of prerogative powers, of greater importance than leaving the 
EU, have been taken without any possibility of judicial control: examples include the 
declarations of war in 1914 and 1939…It is important for courts to understand that the 
legalisation of political issues is not always constitutionally appropriate, and may be 
fraught with risk, not least for the judiciary.96 
Lord Carnwath agreed with Lord Reed that the triggering of Article 50 is a matter of form 
rather than of substance. His conclusion on this point was underscored by his appreciation of 
the role of political accountability within the constitutional framework: 
[Triggering Article 50] is merely the start of an essentially political process of 
negotiation and decision-making within the framework of that article. True it is that it 
is intended to lead in due course to the removal of EU law as a source of rights and 
obligations in domestic law. That process will be conducted by the Executive, but it 
will be accountable to Parliament for the course of those negotiations and the contents 
of any resulting agreement. Furthermore, whatever the shape of the ultimate 
                                                          
91 See e.g. R. (The Public Law Project) v Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39, [2016] A.C. 1531. 
92 R. v Home Secretary, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, at p. 131, per Lord Hoffmann. 
93 See e.g. Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), at p. 
35-37.  
 [2014] UKSC 60, [2015] A.C. 945, at para. 32. 
94 R. v Home Secretary, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 A.C. 513, at p. 567, per Lord Mustill. 
95 Miller (SC), at para. 249. 
96 Miller (SC), at para. 240. 
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agreement, or even in default of agreement, there is no suggestion by the Secretary of 
State that the process can be completed without primary legislation in some form.97  
On this view, there is nothing to fear from the prerogative, the exercise of which is always 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny, through the convention of ministerial responsibility.98 It 
might even be said, in support of this view, that political accountability to Parliament would 
be an effective means of ensuring that the executive will faithfully implement the referendum 
result; perhaps the best way to enforce the requirements of the ‘new’ Constitution (such as 
referendums) is through the tried and trusted ‘old’ methods of the political process.  
B. Emphasising Legal Accountability: the Miller Majority 
In recent years in the UK, legal accountability has tended to have the upper hand, presumably 
because political accountability “has on occasion been perceived as falling short, and 
sometimes well short, of what was needed to bring the performance of the executive into line 
with the law…”, such that, “[t]o avoid a vacuum in which the citizen would be left without 
protection against a misuse of executive powers the courts have had no option but to occupy 
the dead ground in a manner, and in areas of public life, which could not have been foreseen 
30 years ago”.99  
And on the legality of triggering Article 50 without legislation, legal accountability again had 
the upper hand. It was “clear”100 that a wide variety of rights would be lost as a result of the 
triggering of Article 50, including, “for instance, the rights of UK citizens to the benefit of 
employment protection such as the Working Time Directive, to equal treatment and to the 
protection of EU competition law, and the right of non-residents to the benefit of the ‘four 
freedoms’ (free movement of people, goods and capital, and freedom to provide services)”.101 
Accordingly, the Miller majority invoked the ‘principle of legality’ in support of its 
conclusion that statutory authorisation would be required to trigger Article 50: 
“[f]undamental rights cannot be overridden by general … words” in a statute, “because there 
is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed 
unnoticed in the democratic process”.102 Here, the consequences of accepting the 
government’s arguments would be drastic. And the statute was not clear: 
Had the Bill which became the 1972 Act spelled out that ministers would be free to 
withdraw the United Kingdom from the EU Treaties, the implications of what 
Parliament was being asked to endorse would have been clear, and the courts would 
have so decided. But we must take the legislation as it is, and we cannot accept that, 
                                                          
97 Miller (SC), at para. 259. See also Miller (SC), at para. 262. 
98 See also Timothy Endicott, “‘This Ancient, Secretive Royal Prerogative”’, U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 11 
November, 2016 (available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/11/timothy-endicott-this-ancient-
secretive-royal-prerogative/); Parliament and the Prerogative: From the Case of Proclamations  to Miller 
(London: Policy Exchange, 2016). 
99 Fire Brigades Union, at p. 567, per Lord Mustill. All that said, Lord Mustill was in the minority in finding for 
the Minister in that case.  More broadly, the extent to which Parliament is subservient to the executive is a point 
of contention. See e.g. Meg Russell, Daniel Gover and Kristina Wollter, “Does the Executive Dominate the 
Westminster Legislative Process?: Six Reasons for Doubt” (2016) 69 Parliamentary Affairs 286. 
100 Miller (SC), at para. 73. 
101 Miller (SC), at para. 70. In addition, “the right to vote in elections for MEPs, and (albeit by inference) the 
right to stand for election as an MEP” would be “inevitably lost”. Miller (SC), at para. 114. Although the Miller 
majority did not express a definitive view on this point, it did “nothing to undermine and may be regarded as 
reinforcing” the conclusion that statutory authority was needed to trigger Article 50. Miller (SC), at para. 115. 
102 Simms, at p. 131. 
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in Part I of the 1972 Act, Parliament “squarely confront[ed]” the notion that it was 
clothing ministers with the far-reaching and anomalous right to use a treaty-making 
power to remove an important source of domestic law and important domestic 
rights.103 
Indeed, the Miller majority reacted with hostility to the argument that a wide scope should be 
given to prerogative powers because ministers would be politically accountable for their 
actions in triggering Article 50 and renegotiating Britain’s relationship with the EU: 
[This argument] would justify all sorts of powers being accorded to the executive, on 
the basis that ministers could always be called to account for their exercise of any 
power. There is a substantial difference between (i) ministers having a freely 
exercisable power to do something whose exercise may have to be subsequently 
explained to Parliament and (ii) ministers having no power to do that thing unless it is 
first accorded to them by Parliament. The major practical difference between the two 
categories, in a case such as this where the exercise of the power is irrevocable, is that 
the exercise of power in the first category pre-empts any Parliamentary action.104 
It would be wrong, however, to state that the Miller majority venerated legal accountability to 
the exclusion of political accountability. These judges put the definition and enforcement of 
the Sewel Convention firmly in the political domain: “It is well established that the courts of 
law cannot enforce a political convention”.105 Judges “can recognise the operation of a 
political convention in the context of deciding a legal question…but they cannot give legal 
rulings on its operation or scope, because those matters are determined within the political 
world”.106 The Miller majority insisted that they did not “underestimate the importance of 
constitutional conventions, some of which play a fundamental role in the operation of our 
constitution”, but they left the “policing” of the “scope and the manner” of the Sewel 
Convention to the ordinary workings of the political process.107 While the Miller majority’s 
resort to the principle of legality was unsurprising in view of their conclusion that triggering 
Article 50 would have substantive effects – eliminating a source of law and a range of rights 
– it is in tension with their willingness to leave the enforcement of the Sewel Convention – 
set out, let us remember, in a statute – entirely to conventional mechanisms of political 
accountability.   
IV. Legislative Response 
The same fault lines, between form and substance, old and new, and political and legal, can 
be perceived to have been at work in the political debates subsequent to Miller. Interestingly, 
they shifted in a very different way, with form triumphing over substance, the referendum 
                                                          
103 Miller (SC), at para. 87. See also at para. 108, rejecting the argument that subsequent EU-related legislation 
had been enacted on the understanding that ministers could trigger Article 50 without legislative authorisation. 
Legal accountability might also be perceived to underlie the analytical starting point adopted by the Divisional 
Court. It firmly rejected the UK government’s “contention that the onus was on the claimants to point to express 
language in the statute removing the Crown’s prerogative” and emphasised instead the “usual constitutional 
principle that, unless Parliament legislates to the contrary, the Crown should not have power to vary the law of 
the land by the exercise of its prerogative powers”. Miller (DC), at para. 84. In other words, the fact that rights 
were at risk influenced the starting point that the Divisional Court adopted. 
104 Miller (SC), at para. 92. 
105 Miller (SC), at para. 141. 
106 Miller (SC), at para. 146. 
107 Miller (SC), at para. 151. 
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result giving the new constitution a decisive victory over the old, and political accountability 
trumping legal accountability. 
The Miller majority noted only that there must be “domestic sanction” in “appropriate 
statutory form”108 for the triggering of Article 50 and suggested even that “a very brief 
statute” would be sufficient.109 The legislative response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miller was swift. The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 received Royal 
Assent on March 16, 2017. The Act contains one substantive section, which provides: 
(1) The Prime Minister may notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European  
Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU. 
(2) This section has effect despite any provision made by or under the European 
Communities Act 1972 or any other enactment.110 
The triggering of Article 50 was presented by the government as a mere administrative 
formality made inevitable by the referendum, rather than a policy-laden decision that should 
be accompanied by sustained parliamentary debate to outline publicly the government’s 
objectives for the negotiations with the EU; it was, as the Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union put it, “simply about Parliament empowering the Government to implement a 
decision already made”.111 The Opposition attempted “to establish a number of key principles 
that the Government must seek to negotiate during the process”,112 but did not think it 
appropriate that the Prime Minister should be “blocked from starting the Article 50 
negotiations”.113 The Bill in unamended form was given its third reading by a strong majority 
of MPs.114 Proposals from the House of Lords to amend the Bill to guarantee the rights of EU 
nationals resident in Britain115 and a parliamentary vote on the final terms of the agreement 
negotiated under the auspices of Article 50116 were rejected by the House of Commons,117 a 
rejection in which the Lords rapidly acquiesced.118 Moreover, the triggering of Article 50 – 
with the inevitable impact it will have on Britain’s devolution arrangements – was effected 
without the consent of the devolved legislatures (indeed, over the formal objection of the 
                                                          
108 Miller (SC), at para. 86. 
109 Miller (SC), at para. 122. But see Paul Daly, “The Form of the Article 50 Authorisation Bill: Some Early 
Thoughts on Miller [2017] UKSC 5”, Administrative Law Matters, January 24, 2017 (available at: 
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from the European Union. 
111 HC Hansard, 31 January 2017, col 818 (Mr. David Davis). 
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Scottish Parliament119). Although, as the Miller majority observed, an important point of 
constitutional principle was at issue,120 the brevity of the legislative response to Miller would 
seem to vindicate Lord Carnwath’s view that requiring Parliament to pass a statute to permit 
the executive to trigger Article 50 would be “an exercise in pure legal formalism”.121   
The ‘constitutional’ nature of the 1972 Act played little or no role in Parliament’s 
deliberations; devolution issues, similarly, were not especially influential, despite the best 
efforts of MPs from the Scottish National Party.122 But while the referendum result did not 
exert a significant gravitational pull on the reasoning of the Miller majority, it had a very 
different effect on Parliament’s post-Miller deliberations. Time and again members of both 
Houses invoked the referendum result as a justification for drafting a narrow statute, designed 
to give the Prime Minister the power to trigger Article 50 but no more. A former government 
minister, who had campaigned to remain in the European Union, argued that refusing to vote 
in favour of legislation giving the Prime Minister the authority to trigger Article 50 would 
“risk putting Parliament against people, provoking a deep constitutional crisis in our country 
and alienating people who already feel alienated”.123 To go any further would be to place 
fetters on the government’s achievement of the policy objective set by those who voted in the 
referendum. As Lord Taverne put it, the effect of the referendum – an exercise in direct 
democracy – was to replace Burke with Rousseau, to substitute an MP’s judgement as to the 
public interest with the general will as expressed in a referendum.124 
One reason that the Lords’ amendments were rejected by the House of Commons was (at 
least according to the Opposition125) that the government provided assurances that the rights 
of EU nationals would be addressed as a priority in the negotiations with the EU subsequent 
to the triggering of Article 50126 and that Parliament would be given a meaningful vote on the 
final deal negotiated between the EU and the British government.127  In both cases, deviations 
from the assurances given will presumably be addressed (if necessary) through the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility. Should the ministers renege on their promises, they will face 
political consequences in the House of Commons. These are precisely the mechanisms of 
political accountability invoked in dissent in Miller by Lord Reed and Lord Carnwath. More 
generally, the final fate of the rights imperilled by the triggering of Article 50 will be 
determined at the negotiating table. Parliament could have fettered in advance the freedom of 
the executive to bargain away some of the rights – indeed, was urged that this was required as  
a matter of legal obligation128 – but did not do so. As Lord Carnwath put it, it was difficult to 
see how the effects of triggering Article 50 would be “mitigated by a statute which does no 
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more than authorise service of the [Article 50] notice”.129 The rights will be protected (if at 
all) through the operation of the ordinary mechanisms of ministerial responsibility. In the 
end, political accountability trumped legal accountability. 
By observing that politicians viewed Article 50 as a matter of form, felt bound by the 
referendum result and preferred to rely on the ordinary arrangements for the accountability of 
the executive to Parliament, I do not mean to level an additional criticism at the Miller 
majority. Judges must decide cases based on the law, not on prognostications as to how the 
political branches will react to judicial decisions. My point is that the fault lines can again 
serve as useful analytical tools; here, their application to the political response to Miller 
reveals the very different way in which the fault lines shifted in a political, as opposed to a 
legal, context. Miller is a vivid illustration of how judges and politicians can respond very 
differently to the same stimuli. 
V. Conclusion 
Considering the Miller litigation and the legislative response to it as attempts to navigate the 
fault lines between form and substance, the old constitution and the new constitution, and 
political accountability and legal accountability achieves the three objectives set out in the 
Introduction. 
First, using the fault lines as analytical tools enhances the legal community’s understanding 
of Miller by placing the resolution of the issue relating to the triggering of Article 50 in a 
broader context. Lord Carnwath was right to observe that the litigation should not be seen in 
“binary” terms, as a clash between Parliament and the executive.130 Rather, it raised 
important questions about the way British lawyers understand their constitution, in particular, 
how to accommodate constitutional innovations such as EU membership, referendums and 
devolution. 
Second, close examination of the fault lines reveals significant tensions in the reasoning of 
the Miller majority. For the Miller majority substance trumped form on the nature of the 1972 
Act. However, form trumped substance on the nature of Britain’s devolution arrangements. 
The new constitution trumped the old inasmuch as the ‘constitutional’ nature of the 1972 Act 
limited the executive’s ability to alter unilaterally the functioning of the legislation. But the 
old trumped the new when it came to the question of the importance of the referendum result 
and devolution arrangements. Finally, the Miller majority was openly hostile to the 
proposition that political methods of control would be adequate to safeguard the individual 
rights put in mortal danger by the triggering of Article 50. Yet when it came to the devolution 
issues, legal accountability was not influential at all: constitutional conventions would be 
interpreted and enforced in the political realm only.  
Third, that such a significant decision of British constitutional law can be marked by a failure 
to chart a consistent course along clearly visible fault lines and by profound disagreement 
between groups of judges and commentators seems to confirm Professor Sir William Wade’s 
observation that “the nearer they come to the bedrock of the constitution, the less certain the 
judges [and, for that matter, academics] seem to be”.131 Indeed, that the bedrock of the 
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constitution may shift because of the operation of the fault lines I have described may 
account to some extent for the judges’ (and academics’) lack of surefootedness. As the Miller 
majority justly observed, Britain’s “constitutional arrangements have developed over time in 
a pragmatic as much as in a principled way”,132 with members of the political branches 
contributing just as much as the judges to the developments and, as the aftermath to Miller 
illustrates, often contributing in a different way. 
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